Frequently Asked Questions (V4)

Common Criteria Concepts

Contents

  1. What is a TOE?
  2. What is a security functional component?
  3. What are Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs)?
  4. What is a class?
  5. What is a family?
  6. What is a component?
  7. What is an Evaluation Authority?

1. What is a TOE?

A Target of Evaluation (TOE) is that part of the product or system which is subject to evaluation. The TOE security threats, objectives, requirements, and summary specification of security functions and assurance measures together form the primary inputs to the Security Target (ST) (see Criteria FAQ, Question 4), which are used by the evaluators as the basis for evaluation.

2. What is a security functional component?

Security functional components are used to express a wide range of security functional requirements within PPs and STs. Components are ordered sets of functional elements. These sets are grouped into families with common objectives (e.g. Security Audit Trail Protection) and classes with common intent (e.g. Audit). Functional components may be found in Part II of the Common Criteria. Components other than those defined may be used at the discretion of evaluation authorities. A hierarchy exists between components.

3. What are Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs)?

Assurance levels define a scale for measuring the criteria for the evaluation of PPs and STs. Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) are constructed from the assurance components contained in Part III of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CCITSE). EALs provide a uniformly increasing scale which balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. There are seven hierarchically ordered EALs. The higher the EAL, the greater the degree of assurance.

EAL1: Functionally Tested

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal cost. An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified threats.

EAL2: Structurally Tested

EAL2 requires the cooperation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.

EAL3: Methodically Tested and Checked

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practices.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.

EAL4: Methodically Designed, Tested, and Reviewed

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.

EAL5: Semiformally Designed and Tested

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialized techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.

EAL6: Semiformally Verified Design and Tested

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.

EAL7: Formally Verified Design and Tested

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.

4. What is a class?

The term class is used for the most general grouping (e.g. FAU - Audit) of security requirements. All the members of a class share a common focus, while differing in coverage of security objectives. The members of a class are termed families.

5. What is a family?

A family is a grouping of sets of security requirements (e.g. FAU_ARP) that share security objectives but may differ in emphasis or rigor. The members of a family are termed components.

6. What is a component?

A component describes a specific set of security requirements and is the smallest selectable set of security requirements for inclusion in the structures defined in the Common Criteria (e.g. FAU_ARP.2.1). The set of components within a family may be ordered to represent increasing strength or capability of security requirements that share a common purpose. They may also be partially ordered to represent related non-hierarchical sets. In some instances, there is only one component in a family so ordering is not applicable.

7. What is an Evaluation Authority?

An Evaluation Authority is a body that implements the Common Criteria for a specific community by means of an evaluation scheme and thereby sets the standards and monitors the quality of evaluations conducted by bodies within that community. NSA is the evaluation authority for Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CCITSE) evaluations conducted under TTAP.


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Last updated Mon Aug 16 13:16:59 1999
URL: http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/process/faq-sect3.html
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